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Abstract 
Drawing on an empirical study of four major international management consultancies, this article 
examines managerial efforts to construct ‘global’ organizations. We show how these efforts are 
undermined by inter-office conflicts over the utilization of firm-wide human resources in relation to both 
local and transnational client projects. We argue that such constraints cannot be adequately understood as 
an outcome of inappropriate organizational structures and incentives since this explanation ignores the 
important role of institutional contexts. In this vein, we outline and develop four different institutionalist 
lenses and apply them to the empirical findings. In so doing, we reveal the need to adopt a multi-
dimensional institutionalist approach to the study of ‘global’ firms, one that can account for not only 
national effects but also transnational and neocolonial influences on these organizations.  
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Introduction 
In the last two decades, a number of corporate executives and management scholars have claimed that, as 
a response to the increasing complexity of the international business environment, the multinational 
corporation (MNC) is taking on a new form (variously described, among other terms, as ‘transnational’ 
[Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989], ‘metanational’ [Doz et al., 2001] and ‘globally integrated’ [Palmisano, 
2006]). Led by a cosmopolitan executive leadership team, this new kind of MNC abandons its ties to its 
country of origin, locates its operations anywhere in the world, taps into skills and knowledge wherever 
they might be located, and integrates its constituent parts into a unified structure by means of shared 
management systems and practices. In short, the contemporary MNC (hereafter referred to as ‘global’) is 
said to have transcended national borders in terms of how it organizes its operations.  
However, a growing body of research in the field of organization studies reveals that ‘the notion of 
the global corporation transcending national boundaries is, very largely, myth’ (Ferner, 1997, p.  19). In 
practice, MNCs remain deeply rooted in their country of origin (Doremus et al., 1998; Hu, 1992; Whitley, 
2001) and are also significantly shaped by the host national institutional contexts across which they 
operate (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005). Home/host country effects manifest themselves at various levels 
and, moreover, lead to headquarters-subsidiary tensions that undermine the effective implementation of 
shared management systems/practices (Almond & Ferner, 2006; Boussebaa & Morgan, 2008; 
Faulconbridge et al., 2012). From this perspective, therefore, national contexts continue to have a major 
influence on the organization of MNCs (see also Ailon & Kunda, 2009).  
The observation that national contexts remain a key determinant of MNC organization calls into 
question the ‘global’ firm argument. However, simply to reject this argument and treat the MNC as a 
federation of largely separate ‘national’ entities is to neglect the transnational systems/practices that 
multinationals have implemented over the last twenty years in an effort to give meaning and effectiveness 
to the idea of the ‘global’ firm. Moreover, and as is the case with the ‘global’ firm perspective, the view 
of the multinational as a federation leaves out of consideration the uneven geography of this entity and, in 
particular, the impact of long-term processes of colonial and imperial domination on MNC organization. 
In this article, therefore, we argue for the need to develop a multi-dimensional approach to the study of 
MNCs, one that can account for not only national institutional effects but also transnational and 
neocolonial influences on the firm and its constituent parts. To advance this argument, we present 
qualitative research on international management consultancies. Such firms are an ideal empirical site for 
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our purpose because they are present in a large number of countries and, more importantly, tend to 
portray themselves explicitly and publicly to clients and others as truly ‘global’ firms (see e.g. Bäcklund 
& Werr, 2004; Jones, 2005). We examine such a claim by addressing the following question: how, and to 
what effect, do managerial efforts to create ‘global’ firm structures interplay with national, transnational 
and neocolonial influences on MNC organization? 
The article is structured as follows. We first examine the literature on the organization of MNCs, 
contrasting the traditional contingency view with the institutionalist perspective. In an effort to advance 
the development of the latter perspective, we identify and critically evaluate a variety of institutionalist 
approaches to the study of MNC organization. After outlining our study, we present our findings on some 
of the key coordination mechanisms that the four case study firms put in place to operate as ‘global’ 
organizations. We then reveal how, from the perspective of our interviewees, these mechanisms failed to 
fulfil their purpose. In the following discussion, we consider the degree to which the various 
institutionalist lenses we identified help explain our empirical findings. In broad terms, we argue that a 
combined and extended institutionalist framework is required. We conclude by assessing our contribution 
and suggesting areas for future research. 
 
MNC organization and varieties of institutional analysis  
Until the last decade, organization studies as a field of enquiry paid relatively little attention to MNCs as 
specific forms of organization. There existed a tradition of research on the international dimensions of 
organizational behaviour (e.g. Adler & Graham, 1989; Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980) but 
this was mainly concerned with studying micro-level issues such as communication, leadership and 
negotiation across cultures rather than examining MNCs as organizational structures (for  notable 
exceptions, see  Ghoshal & Westney, 1993; Kogut & Singh, 1988). The study of MNCs was left mainly 
to economists using models of transaction costs to explain why and how firms internationalized. Insofar 
as organizational issues were concerned, contingency theory provided the main framework of analysis 
(see e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). This perspective, which focused on identifying invariant relationships 
between types of contingencies and  types of multinational structures, was dominated by what March and 
Olsen (1989) describe as a ‘logic of consequences’: it assumed that managers engaged in rational 
decision-making, aiming to maximize performance by choosing organizational structures that best fitted 
environmental contingencies such as market demand and technological developments. This logic 
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continues to inform (explicitly or implicitly) some studies of MNC organization in the field of 
international business/management (see e.g. Aharoni, 1996; Segal-Horn & Dean, 2009) but, within 
organization studies, it has become increasingly questioned and research has moved beyond an effort to 
develop universal models of organizational structure (see e.g. March, 2007). 
Although a contextual approach to the study of organizations can lead in many directions, in this 
article, we adopt an institutionalist framework of analysis. A key characteristic of this is a rejection of the 
logic of consequences described above in favour of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen, 1989), 
in which human action is assumed to be driven by rules of appropriate behaviour. Such rules are 
organized into institutions and followed because they are perceived as ‘natural, rightful, expected and 
legitimate’ (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 7). From this perspective, organizational structure is seen to take 
shape not so much in rational response to the dictates of objective contingencies but rather in response to 
rules specifying appropriate ways of organizing work. Such a view raises a new set of questions such as: 
where do rules come from; how do they become institutionalized; how are they manipulated and 
reshaped; and how are they replaced (see Greenwood et al., 2008)? Fortunately, however, the concern of 
this article is not institutional theory per se, but its relevance for understanding MNCs as organizations. In 
terms of how this relationship has evolved, it is useful to start by comparing the ‘institutional duality’ 
approach with the ‘comparative capitalisms’ approach.  
 
Institutional duality and comparative capitalisms 
The ‘institutional duality’ approach is based largely on the research of Kostova and her colleagues 
(Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Drawing on neo-institutional theory (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell , 
1983; Scott, 1995), these scholars argue that each country has a distinctive ‘institutional profile’ – i.e. a 
unique set of cognitive, normative and regulatory institutions – and that, therefore, MNC headquarters 
and subsidiaries develop ways of doing things that are appropriate to the different national contexts in 
which they are embedded. This then creates one of a number of barriers to the effective implementation 
of globally shared management practices. That is, headquarters might seek to transfer its practices to 
subsidiaries in order to achieve a degree of firm-wide consistency but, being under domestic institutional 
pressures, subsidiaries will not necessarily implement (i.e. internalize) such practices at the local level if 
perceived to be inappropriate in that context – mere ‘ceremonial adoption’ is more likely. The greater the 
‘institutional distance’ (Kostova, 1999) between home- and host-country contexts, the more difficulty 
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headquarters will have in transferring its practices to subsidiaries and, by implication, in facilitating the 
development of ‘global’ firm structures. 
This approach has been valuable in bringing a clearer focus on the role of institutions in the 
organization of MNCs. However, its theoretical conception of institutions is limited given that, as Jackson 
and Deeg (2008, p. 541) point out, it ‘approaches institutions as unidimensional “variables”’. Institutions 
in this view are not socially or historically embedded but accessed through individual attitudes and then 
aggregated into scores – an approach similar to, if more developed than, that followed by Hofstede (1980) 
and therefore subject to the same conceptual and methodological weaknesses (for notable critiques of 
Hofstede’s approach, see Ailon, 2008; Baskerville, 2003; McSweeney, 2002). Moreover, the connections 
between institutions within a particular country and the degree of their interdependence, complementarity 
and reinforcement are not explored (see Crouch [2010] for a discussion of these issues). Writing from a 
more sympathetic position, Shenkar et al. (2008, p. 910) suggest that the view of institutions 
underpinning the ‘institutional duality’ approach oversimplifies a very complex reality and, hence, 
constitutes ‘a poor representation of the actual environment’. Indeed, Kostova and her colleagues 
themselves have recently challenged the value of studying MNCs from this perspective and instead 
suggested a more complex view of the relationship between MNCs and national contexts, one that is more 
dynamic and political than previously acknowledged (see Kostova et al., 2008).  
The ‘comparative capitalisms’ approach moves away from both attempts to construct institutions via 
the belief systems of individuals and efforts to create a measure of institutional distance. Instead, it relies 
on traditional comparative approaches to the study of national institutional differences, in which the 
societies under consideration are systematically compared holistically and historically (see e.g. Kogut, 
2010; Locke & Thelen, 1996). Although there are many differences between proponents of this approach 
(for different perspectives, see e.g. Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2010; Whitley, 1999), the common 
theme for the purpose of this article is the emphasis placed on how the ‘rules of the game’ for economic 
actors are shaped by broad societal forces deriving from distinctive financial, educational, training, legal 
and political systems. From this perspective, different national business systems engender different 
patterns of work and modes of organizing. Such differences, in turn, lead to the emergence of different 
sectors in different societies and also different capacities to produce firms that are competitive on 
international markets – a process discussed in terms of ‘sectoral specialization’ (see Hall & Soskice, 
2001; also Quack et al., 2000). In terms of MNC organization, therefore, the ‘comparative capitalisms’ 
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approach is, firstly, concerned with how home- and host-country institutions (as constituted through 
historical processes of politics and change) shape distinctive ways of working/organizing at the levels of 
headquarters and subsidiaries and how this, in turn, impacts on efforts to create ‘global’ firm structures 
(see e.g. Almond & Ferner, 2006; Boussebaa & Morgan, 2008; Geppert & Williams, 2006; Faulconbridge 
et al., 2012; see also contributions in Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2011; Morgan et al., 2001). Secondly, this 
approach seeks to examine how specific institutional configurations shape the nature of sectoral 
specialization and thereby the growth and internationalization of certain types of firms (see Quack et al. 
[2000] for an analysis and critique of sectoral specialization; also Taylor, 2004). Here, and as will be 
discussed later, a sector such as management consultancy emerges in particular conditions and, whilst its 
skills and know-how may be transferable to other contexts, continues to be shaped significantly by its 
origins in a particular form of capitalism.  
 
Alternative approaches: Transnationalism and postcolonialism 
Both ‘institutional duality’ and ‘comparative capitalisms’ approaches tend to emphasize the fragmentation 
of the MNC resulting from its location in multiple national institutional environments. The MNC is 
viewed as a temporary federation, an arena of competing ‘local logics of appropriateness’, and thus as a 
dynamic site of conflict, negotiation and accommodation. The problem with both approaches, however, is 
that they underestimate the degree to which the MNC can impose and sustain a ‘transnational logic of 
appropriateness’ within its boundaries through the implementation of various firm-wide networks, 
systems and practices. They also tend to underestimate wider globalization forces, perhaps best captured 
in the ‘world society’ perspective (e.g. Drori et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 1997). According to this 
perspective, rules of appropriateness often extend beyond national borders due to the growing importance 
of international organizations such as the OECD, UN and WTO; the growth of various transnational 
communities (see Djelic & Quack, 2010) and global regulatory agencies (see Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006); the increasing internationalization of management education (see Wedlin, 2006); and the 
widespread diffusion of the ‘globalization’ discourse through newspapers and corporate press releases 
(see e.g. Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). Thus, like many other social actors, MNCs are embedded in a 
‘metainstitutional field [that is] increasingly disconnected from national institutional systems’ (Kostova et 
al., 2008, p. 998, original emphasis). This transnational embeddedness, together with the MNC’s own 
power to structure itself independently of national contexts, suggests that MNC organization cannot 
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simply be reduced to an analysis of conflicts between different national institutional logics. The MNC is, 
in many cases, the carrier of a broader, transnational logic that can be distinguished from discourses 
articulated in particular local domains.  
However, a shortcoming of this meta-institutional approach is that it potentially ‘privilege[s] large-
scale macrosocial forces over local processes of adjustment, articulation, ambivalence, or resistance’ 
(Fourcade & Savelsberg, 2006, p. 514). It recognizes the potential disjuncture or ‘loose coupling’ 
between rationalized scripts and what actually goes on inside organizations, but places strong emphasis 
on the ‘enactment’ of universal models. Other authors have therefore sought to combine an 
acknowledgement of the emergence of a transnational sphere with an equal recognition of the national or 
local domain. For example, Morgan (2001) and Morgan et al. (2003) use the concept of the ‘transnational 
social space’ (Pries, 1999) to emphasize that the boundaries of the MNC as an organization overlay the 
boundaries of national contexts, creating a multi-layered phenomenon that is structured precisely through 
interactions between transnational and national or local spheres (for an exemplary and detailed discussion 
of these multi-level processes, see Halliday and Carruthers’ [2009] study of how international 
organizations such as the IMF, UN and World Bank sought to implement corporate bankruptcy laws in a 
group of Asian countries and how national policy-makers responded to such efforts). Increasingly, this 
approach to the study of MNCs, which we label the ‘transnational’ approach, is also pointing to the need 
to take into account the uneven geography of the MNC as a socio-economic space (Boussebaa, 2008, 
2009; Morgan, 2011). It shows how some subsidiaries are much more significant than others in terms of 
resource endowment, productive capability and financial profitability, and that such differences shape the 
density of communication and network activity between, and the degree of power held by, different parts 
of the firm. Thus, some areas of the firm are ‘peripheral’, relatively disconnected and producing little 
value (or at least can be made to seem that way, as we shall discuss below) whilst others are more 
‘central’ to the production process and able to engage in intensive inter-unit networks (see also Barrett et 
al., 2005). The degree of centrality, in turn, shapes the extent to which subsidiaries can participate in the 
transnational sphere (see e.g. Ferner et al., 1995) as well as the degree of their commitment to developing 
‘global’ firms structures (Boussebaa, 2008). Clearly, as the research on subsidiary initiative and voice has 
shown, these sorts of structural imbalances are not fixed in time since subsidiary actors can strategize to 
increase their centrality in the MNC via mechanisms of voice (see e.g. Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) and 
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to augment their value producing capabilities by, for example, innovating on their own initiative (see e.g. 
Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005).  
Our understanding of these transnational conditions and dynamics can also usefully draw on recent 
applications of postcolonial theory to the study of MNCs (e.g. Frenkel, 2008; Shimoni, 2011; Shimoni & 
Berghmann, 2006). This line of research encourages us to approach and conceptualize the MNC in terms 
of not only a clash between different logics of appropriateness but also an unequal encounter between 
colonizing (mostly Western/Northern) and colonized (typically Eastern/Southern) organizational actors. 
In other words, it embeds global-local tensions in long-standing, macro-level processes of colonial and 
imperial domination (see also Frenkel & Shenhav, 2003; Jack & Westwood, 2009; Prasad, 2003). Such a 
view, which we label the ‘postcolonial’ perspective, is necessary because the various national contexts 
across which the MNC operates are not simply separate and different institutional settings; they are also 
societies that have been intertwined in a complex and shifting hierarchy of nations over centuries. Smith 
and Meiskins (1995) alluded to this kind of hierarchy in their concept of ‘dominance effects’, which 
referred to the way in which certain societies dominated particular eras of capitalist development as 
exemplars of work organization. However, in our discussion, we shall approach this phenomenon in 
postcolonial theoretical terms to refer to a longer running process of colonial and imperial dominance in 
the world economy which continues to have effects on MNC organization. Most of the world’s largest 
MNCs, for example, are headquartered in former colonial powers (e.g. Britain and France) or in the US 
which arguably took on a modified form of imperial power in the period after 1945 (see Gabel & Bruner, 
2003; Fortune, 2011). Many of their subsidiaries are in countries that were once formally colonized and 
parts of empires and that have continued in many cases to provide their former imperial rulers with 
markets, materials and labour. As such, MNC organization is, as Frenkel (2008, p. 924) puts it, 
‘increasingly a matter of relations between dominating and dominated societies’, between colonizing and 
colonized spaces, and therefore not merely between home- and host- country settings and/or transnational 
and national spheres.  
In sum, from an institutionalist viewpoint, the organization of the MNC can be approached from 
four different perspectives – institutional duality, comparative capitalisms, transnationalism and 
postcolonialism. In this article, our aim is to engage with these four approaches empirically. Broadly 
speaking, any institutionalist approach will emphasize the centrality of logics of appropriateness to MNC 
organization. If we follow the ‘institutional duality’ approach however, we would expect to observe a lack 
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of subsidiary commitment to ‘global’ firm structures due to conflicting home- and host-country logics of 
appropriateness. We would expect a similar outcome if we follow the ‘comparative capitalisms’ approach 
but, in addition, we would expect headquarters-subsidiary relations to reflect sectoral specialization 
dynamics. If we follow the ‘transnational’ approach, we would expect to observe the co-existence of 
national and transnational logics of appropriateness as well as varying levels of subsidiary engagement 
resulting from the uneven geography of the MNC. If we follow the ‘postcolonial’ approach, we would 
expect to see various logics of appropriateness in conflict and cooperation with each other based on 
historical processes of colonial and imperial domination. Our research aim is therefore to establish which 
of these approaches is best able to explain our empirical data.  
 
Methodology 
Gaining access to management consultancies is known to be difficult (Sturdy et al., 2009). As Kipping 
(1999, p. 194) notes, these organizations ‘are extremely secretive, preserve few internal documents, and 
divulge even less’. Our own experience with this problem led us to collect data through individual 
interviews and select participants using the snowball sampling method. A total of 61 interviews were 
conducted across four of the world’s 20 largest international management consultancies (see Table 1), 
which, for the purpose of confidentiality, we refer to as Consultancy 1, Consultancy 2, Consultancy 3 and 
Consultancy 4. Each firm employed thousands of staff in scores of countries across continents and 
provided services for many of the Fortune Global 500 corporations as well as government agencies and 
other national organizations. Two of the firms were American by origin, one continental-European and 
one comprised independent national partnerships, albeit with a strong US heritage and a very largely 
Anglo-American executive leadership team (more precise details are not provided in order to protect the 
firms’ anonymity).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The interviews were conducted over a period of ten months in 2006 with staff based in the UK 
subsidiaries of the firms. Clearly, what the research participants were able to describe was their own 
particular, UK context-dependent experience of working in a ‘global’ firm. We would expect that, had 
our interviewees been from France, the USA or elsewhere, there would have been certain differences (as 
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well as similarities) in their responses. We attempt to acknowledge and clarify this limitation as the article 
develops. Nevertheless, in the absence of any similar study, a geographically limited sample still has the 
potential to make a contribution in opening up the issues that we describe.  
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. They focused on the 
mechanisms by which the firms sought to coordinate international staff transfers and transnational client 
projects. The aim was to examine formal coordination systems and how they were seen to work in 
practice. We interviewed employees at various career levels, from consultant to partner, as shown in 
Table 2 below. Given the professional/managerial nature of consulting work, such a range does not 
exactly conform to conventional ‘bottom-up’ approaches in the field of organizational studies. However, 
we sought to go at least some way beyond the ‘top-down’ research approach that characterizes much of 
the literature on MNC organization. Moreover, we adopted a sceptical attitude throughout the fieldwork, 
making a conscious effort to avoid ‘collecting’ idealized accounts of ‘global’ firm organizing. For 
example, to question partners’ overly positive statements about their firms’ global coordinating 
capabilities, we often used comments by managers about the difficulties involved in transnational project 
work. We also conducted most interviews out of the office – in airports and hotels for example, with a 
guarantee of personal anonymity, and explained to the participants that we had no interest in evaluating 
firms against each other. Our approach seemed to work to the extent that many of the participants 
appeared to be forthcoming about the challenges involved in developing ‘global’ firm structures. In 
addition to interview data, we consulted publicly available information such as websites, annual reports 
and other publicity material as well as internal documents provided by some interviewees (though of 
course, none of these can be quoted directly in order to preserve the firms’ anonymity).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
We analyzed the interview data in three stages. In the first, we transcribed the interviews verbatim 
and read the transcripts to get a ‘feel’ for the content. In the second stage, we entered the transcripts into 
the qualitative data management software package QSR NVivo® and indexed them by case and interview 
number. Mobilizing a mixture of ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’ (Langley, 1999), we then coded each 
transcript through both ‘tree nodes’, which brought together ‘chunks’ of data that related to pre-defined 
themes established through our literature review (e.g. formal coordination systems, home/host country 
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tensions, etc.), and ‘free nodes’, which linked data segments related to unexpected themes emerging from 
the data (e.g. fee-rate differentials, see below). In the third and final stage, through multiple iterations 
between the data and pre-existing theory, we gradually integrated the tree nodes and free nodes and 
generated what we considered to be the most convincing interpretation of our findings.  
As noted already in relation to conducting the interviews, we sought to be sensitive to, and sceptical 
of, the different meanings that consultants, managers and partners attached to their experiences. In 
particular, we analysed our data in ways that differentiated between idealized statements and more critical 
utterances of the ‘global’ firm. Partners often reproduced the former while managers were typically more 
interested in discussing the challenges they faced in international staff transfers and transnational project 
delivery. The accounts of more junior consultants were more varied or fell somewhere in-between. These 
differences were, however, only tendencies. There was much overlap between respondents. 
In summary, despite some limitations, the data collected provides an unusual opportunity to 
understand something of the experience of ‘global’ firm organizing in the context of international 
management consultancies (see also Boussebaa, 2009). In the following two sections, we report on our 
findings, firstly in relation to managerial efforts to build the ‘global’ firm and then in terms of its limits. 
The interviewees are identified by the letter ‘C’ for Consultant, a number and the name (pseudonym) of 
their firm (e.g. ‘C1, Consultancy 4’). 
 
Building the ‘global’ firm?  
Company websites and our interviews revealed that, in terms of the United Nations Conference of Trade 
and Development indices (UNCTAD, 2008), the firms under study were high on internationalization and 
geographical spread. However, assets, sales and employees were predominantly concentrated in offices 
based in the largest consultancy markets – principally the US and the UK, and, to a lesser extent, the 
larger continental European economies. Thus, the size of offices in each of our four firms varied greatly. 
Some were substantial operations, delivering a range of services for domestic and overseas markets. For 
instance, a partner commented that his office had a ‘…significant presence in the UK. We have got 
thousands of people in this country. We would be a FTSE 30 company if we were a UK firm’ (C3, 
Consultancy 1). Other offices were relatively small, employing as few as ten people and being responsible 
for developing business locally or assisting in the delivery of the transnational projects led by larger 
offices elsewhere. Offices were grouped into geographical clusters (e.g. Americas, EMEA, Asia) whereby 
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smaller offices were generally controlled by larger operations within the same region (e.g. UK and Ireland 
were part of the same unit with the former being the main office to which the latter was subordinated).  
Our data also revealed that the client projects which the firms delivered varied greatly in terms of 
size and scale. Some were run with local clients (e.g. government agencies, national companies and MNC 
subsidiaries) and thus relatively small and confined within one national context. Others were conducted 
with the global headquarters of multinational clients and thus typically large and transnational in scope.  
The firms promised clients to use ‘the best person for the job’ on projects. What this meant, in theory, is 
that they would assemble project teams based on individual ability and client need rather than 
geographical location. Thus, if a project managed by a particular office required expertise not available 
locally, that office would call upon offices overseas to fill the gap and thereby provide the client with the 
best possible service. As one partner put it, ‘for each opportunity that presents itself, we pull together the 
best possible team, wherever it may come from’ (C1, Consultancy 2). The firms also promised (in the 
case of multinational clients running transnational projects) a ‘truly global service’. By this, the firms 
meant that they would provide a service that would be both differentiated (i.e. responsive to the cultural 
and linguistic specificities of different nations) and integrated (i.e. internationally consistent in terms of 
pricing, methods and standards). 
To fulfil these promises, the four firms put in place variations of two related coordination systems: 
global resourcing systems and global service teams. The resourcing systems were online databases 
designed to facilitate the inter-office exchange of consultants for the staffing of client projects. They 
provided information on the location and availability of consultants and on openings related to both 
ongoing and new projects. According to our interviewees, consultants had worldwide access to this 
information and could get involved in projects anywhere in the world by contacting the relevant project 
managers. Equally, project managers could use the resourcing systems to search for consultants in the 
formation of their teams. The global service teams, for their part, were assembled on an ad hoc basis in 
response to client demand. They typically consisted of several sub-teams based in each of the countries in 
which a multinational client required service. A partner headed each sub-team. The sub-team based in the 
country in which the client was headquartered acted as the lead team at the head of which was a global 
client service partner (hereafter, GCSP), whose responsibility was to manage the interface between the 
client, his/her team and the other sub-teams involved in service delivery. 
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The resourcing systems and service teams were key elements in making the firms ‘global’ from an 
organizational point of view. The research participants viewed them as concrete parts of their 
organizational lives and appeared largely committed to their implementation. As one partner explained, 
‘these systems are important. How can you work as a global firm if you can’t move people around the 
world and if you can’t work in global teams? This is what our clients expect and this is what we do’ (C4, 
Consultancy 3). However, and as we shall see in the following sections, the two systems were being 
continually undermined by inter-office conflicts of interest. 
 
The limits of the ‘global’ firm 
The key problem from the perspective of most of the interviewees was that the logic of the resourcing 
systems and service teams was at odds with the way in which the firms’ subsidiaries and the employees 
within them were evaluated and rewarded for their work. Respondents described how the subsidiaries 
(usually based at country level) essentially operated as separate profit centres. Each was headed by a 
managing partner with responsibilities for achieving sales, revenue and profit targets, and for managing 
the performance of the people employed in his or her subsidiary. These responsibilities placed managing 
partners, and by implication those operating below them, under a great deal of pressure to optimize the 
performance of their respective office. This pressure, in turn, led to significant inter-office conflicts of 
interest over the allocation of revenues and, as a result, undermined the raison d’être of both the 
resourcing systems and the service teams.  
The four firms attempted to overcome these conflicts by linking a proportion of subsidiary 
incentives to global profits but, according to our interviewees, this change had a limited impact because 
its ‘global’ component was relatively small and, therefore, seen as insufficient to resolve the above 
problem (cf. Boussebaa, 2009). On-going discussions on the possibility of linking a more significant 
proportion of subsidiary incentives to overall firm profitability were taking place within each of the four 
consultancies but, at the time of the research, no such change had been made. Indeed, some of the 
interviewees explained that this potential solution was extremely difficult to implement because it 
required a considerable transfer of profits from the largest and most successful offices to the smaller ones. 
It meant that the financial rewards and, by implication, the power and prestige of the most profitable 
offices would be adversely affected, and was therefore resisted by these dominant units. Some of the 
consultants we interviewed also commented that many overseas offices suffered from a ‘lack of skills and 
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expertise’ and, as such, contributed little to the overall success of the firms. Therefore, the idea of a global 
performance-based compensation that would redistribute earnings from the top revenue producing offices 
and individuals to the ‘less productive’ peripheral offices was seen as unacceptable from the point of view 
of the major offices. In what follows, we examine the implications of these internal tensions for the 
resourcing systems and service teams that the firms put in place in an effort to create ‘global’ firm 
structures.    
 
Global Resourcing Systems 
At the level of resourcing systems, the problem that our interviewees perceived was two-fold (see also 
Boussebaa, 2009 for a more extensive account). Firstly, subsidiaries tended to avoid utilizing consultants 
based in overseas offices since doing so would inevitably imply losing a proportion of their revenues to 
other offices. One manager explained this problem as follows: 
‘If you want your remuneration to be satisfactory, you have to optimize the country [national 
subsidiary]. So there is a very strong incentive to resource work within the country you are 
operating in.’ (C4, Consultancy 4) 
Secondly, subsidiaries avoided lending their resources to overseas offices given that this would, 
again, reduce local profits. When partners negotiated a price for a consulting project, they calculated the 
direct costs to the office (in terms of salaries, expenses, etc.), the indirect costs (i.e. a form of overhead 
apportionment) and then the resulting profit. In principle, profit always went to the office of the partner 
‘owning’ the project. If a partner lent his/her consultants to work on projects ‘owned’ by other offices, 
his/her office would be reimbursed the direct costs of employing such resources, but was not necessarily 
apportioned a part of the profit. Lending offices perceived this as unacceptable, as the following quote 
demonstrates:  
‘If you were working at home, you would get full recognition of profit. If you were overseas, 
basically all (profit) went to the overseas profit centre… We’d get our costs covered but we wouldn’t 
get any overheads covered so we wouldn’t get any profit from that work. You send people out; ok, 
their salaries are paid but they wouldn’t be contributing to our own targets back in the UK. So that 
drives behaviour.’ (C9, Consultancy 4) 
As a result, subsidiaries tended to resist sharing their resources with other offices. This was 
particularly the case and evident with consultants enjoying a high reputation and high visibility within the 
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firms. Paradoxically, these ‘star consultants’ were the least likely to be used on a worldwide basis because 
their home office considered them to be a key resource that they needed to utilize as much as possible. In 
fact, there was often a tendency to loan overseas those consultants who were seen as least effective or 
with a low profile in the home office and therefore as most likely to be left ‘sitting on the bench’, adding 
to cost, not profitability. This practice, of course, directly contradicted the promise of utilizing ‘the best 
person for the job’ on client projects.  
Some consultants explained that this problem was occasionally resolved by sharing revenues 
between offices more equitably. Thus, offices importing staff would not only reimburse salary costs but 
also provide additional compensation to take into account the lending office’s opportunity cost of not 
employing its resources on domestic projects. However, in practice, this arrangement never fully resolved 
the problem because offices always prioritized their domestic projects on the assumption that they could 
generate more revenue by assigning their consultants to such projects.  
The presence of such inter-office conflicts of interest obviously did not mean that no inter-office 
staff transfers occurred within the firms. The ‘interest of the client’ would typically be stressed as a way 
of persuading offices to share their consultants. There were also reciprocal relations at work, whereby 
offices would sometime lend their resources on the expectation that the borrowing offices would return 
the favour at a later date. Moreover, it was sometimes the case that some offices were so dependent on 
importing experts from other countries to deliver their domestic projects that they would have no choice 
but to absorb the full cost of such resources and thus reduce their possible profit on an engagement, as 
demonstrated in the following quote: 
‘If I have a great opportunity to sell a £100 million worth of work in the UK but I need the supply 
chain solution from Chicago, I am gonna have to bring them over here… I got 20 people from the 
UK I’m trying to put onto this job in the UK but in order for me to get those 20 employed I need 3 
experts from Chicago… I am quite prepared to pay a full arms-length rate for these 3 as if he was 
selling them to a client. So in fact… he gets all the fees for their time working on this client. I get 
nothing. What I get is the benefit of their expertise and the 20 people I can employ who are from the 
UK are going to earn me my money.’ (C4, Consultancy 1)  
However, whilst the above form of exchange was quite common between the UK and the USA, the 
same could not be said where other offices were concerned because significant fee-rate differentials 
existed between Anglo-American offices and the rest (cf. Boussebaa, 2009). The interviewees explained 
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that offices based in the UK and the USA had superior skills and expertise and thus commanded fee rates 
that were considerably higher than those charged out to clients by offices located in other countries. This 
made the importation of American and British resources by offices overseas extremely costly and, hence, 
often impossible. Overseas offices faced the choice of raising their client fees so that they could employ 
UK and US consultants – in this way, they could maintain their profit margin, but, in so doing, they 
risked overpricing themselves and failing to win the business. Alternatively, they could absorb the cost 
themselves, but this would inevitably reduce their profit margin. By contrast, UK and US offices could 
reduce their costs by importing cheaper consultants from overseas (although this was problematic if it 
meant that their own consultants were left ‘on the bench’). One associate partner put it as follows:  
‘I can import people from France and Sweden to work on my projects but I can’t export my people 
to work on French and Swedish projects because the client won’t stand the English fee rates; 
because the expectation of what clients will pay in England is much, much higher than what they 
will pay in the rest of the world.’ (C6, Consultancy 2)  
This difference was even more pronounced between the UK and offices based in small economies 
and developing nations. These ‘peripheral’ subsidiaries would find it prohibitively costly to import 
consultants from the UK and other larger offices. When faced with no choice but to do so, they would 
typically request one consultant at a time ‘but they would be paying through the nose for the privilege’ 
(C8, Consultancy 3). On the other hand, the fact that these ‘peripheral’ offices commanded fee rates that 
were relatively low meant that their employees were sometimes sought after by the larger offices as 
‘cheap resources’ (a variation on outsourcing). 
 
Global Service Teams 
According to the interviewees, the tensions discussed above also acted as a major obstacle to the 
formation of global service teams and, by implication, the delivery of transnational projects. The offices 
‘owning’ such projects almost invariably sought to deliver them by drawing upon their domestic 
resources as a way of maximizing their local profits. This meant that, in practice, global teams were often 
little more than local teams operating internationally. However, a number of factors tended to moderate 
this preference for local teams. For instance, some transnational projects spanned so many countries that 
offices had no choice but to request the assistance of other offices. It was also often the case that offices 
not only lacked the necessary technical expertise to deliver transnational engagements, but also needed 
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additional cultural and linguistic skills to operate in different countries. Although the headquarters of 
multinational clients generally expected their consulting providers to demonstrate ‘global’ capabilities, 
the reality of implementation in multiple countries almost invariably required ‘local’ knowledge. As a 
manager explained: 
‘We’re working for this global client at the moment. When we go to Italy, for example, they are 
expecting us down at the factory level to understand how the market works there. So you have to 
have consultants who have local knowledge, who have the skill sets of working in particular 
markets, who have credibility to consult in those markets’. (C8, Consultancy 2) 
However, as in the case of inter-office staff transfers, the process of assembling global teams was 
frustrated by conflicts over revenue allocations. The interviewees explained that there were often great 
complexities around the question of how revenues would be divided among the participating offices. 
GCSPs typically sought to allocate as many of their local resources as possible to their transnational 
projects in order to maximize their own revenues and profits, inevitably reducing the amount of revenue 
available to overseas offices. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that clients often attempted to 
manage the firms’ fees downwards. As a result, overseas offices tended to resist working on foreign-
owned transnational projects, preferring instead to focus on domestic engagements. When accepting to 
collaborate, they sometimes refused to assign their local staff to such projects on a full-time basis. On 
occasions, they also failed to release the resources that they had initially promised, as demonstrated by the 
following quote:  
‘We’ve got a central team for this project but we’ve (also) got local people in each market who are 
responsible for that market. Now, the way it was set up is that there should have been a full-time 
team of 2 to 3 people in most markets, but they [overseas offices] haven’t actually provided that. So 
the project has been a bit slow and sometimes the relationships have been a bit tricky.’ (C9, 
Consultancy 4) 
Promises were made, but it was easy to lose sight of transnational projects controlled by other 
offices and become preoccupied with the engagements that really mattered, that is, projects run with 
domestic clients. Thus, overseas offices, especially smaller ones, would sometimes offer collaboration 
only half-heartedly. This clearly limited the extent to which GCSPs could freely tap into their firms’ 
international resource pools and, as a result, constrained their ability to offer a ‘truly global service’ to 
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their multinational clients. One manager explained that these complexities were ‘a major obstacle and 
they will continue to be an obstacle’ (C5, Consultancy 4).  
That said, it was sometimes possible for GCSPs to bypass their local counterparts (and therefore the 
associated initial negotiation) and hire or ‘poach’ consultants directly. Indeed, consultants were 
themselves, in theory, free to work on foreign-owned projects. However, in doing so, they risked being 
looked upon less favourably by their local partner/s and becoming less visible in the home office, possibly 
damaging their career prospects as a result. Indeed, local partners acted as the primary influence on 
consultants’ performance appraisals and associated rewards and promotion. They therefore typically 
remained a necessary intermediary in the sourcing process.  
The degree to which overseas partners could resist resource demands and cost pressures from 
GCSPs partly depended on the economic strength of the overseas offices. Partners based the US, 
Germany and France, for example, could easily decline requests by UK GCSPs on the basis that they had 
more important clients to serve, including home-based Fortune Global 500 corporations. In contrast, 
partners based in ‘peripheral’ offices, i.e. offices located in small economies such as Belgium and 
developing nations such as Poland, were less able to do so, especially as they had few, if any, home-based 
multinationals to serve. Here, it is important to note that multinational clients were of high strategic 
importance to the four firms in terms of revenue and reputation. The firms’ executive leadership teams, 
which were composed of partners drawn from global headquarters and the largest subsidiaries such as the 
UK offices, made it clear that their organizations’ growth and success depended on such clients. Failing 
to address the needs of these high priority clients would be contrary to the interests of the ‘global’ firm. In 
this context, GCSPs were reported to possess an enormous degree of influence, making it difficult for 
peripheral subsidiaries to resist their demands.  
Having said this, not all peripheral offices responded in the same way to GCSP requests. For 
example, it was reported that whilst small offices in Europe and other Western nations tended to be 
relatively weak actors that could, to varying degrees, easily be influenced, the same could not be said of 
peripheral offices located in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. The fact that countries in these 
regions were characterized by very different economic, cultural, political and regulatory conditions meant 
that GCSPs were often strongly dependent on the skills, knowledge and networks afforded by offices 
based in these contexts. This is illustrated in the words of an associate partner: 
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‘It is really hard to do business in certain countries. In China, for example, you can’t go into 
business without a local partner: you have to have one; it is the law. You need them [Chinese 
consultants] because you need someone who understands how it works in that country’. (C7, 
Consultancy 3) 
Moreover, several of the offices which in the 1970s and 1980s might have seemed peripheral were now 
increasing in importance because they were based in rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, Russia 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries – nations that are not only evolving into major players on the 
world stage but are also home to an growing number of Fortune Global 500 corporations (Fortune, 2011). 
As such, they were becoming increasingly central to the four firms’ growth and reputation. In this 
context, the GCSPs had little choice but to be more open to negotiation and to offer stronger financial 
incentives than they would otherwise be prepared to do or than they would have offered in the past when 
these markets were worth less.  
 
Discussion 
Our research revealed that the firms under investigation all recognized the pressure to provide high 
quality services for clients in and across diverse national settings, and to operate as ‘global’ organizations 
more generally. In order to so, they had developed a system for identifying and moving consultants across 
countries – the global resourcing system – and a related system for delivering transnational client projects 
– the global service team. Our research also revealed that the subsidiary actors we examined were in 
support of such coordination mechanisms and the idea of the ‘global’ firm more broadly. Yet, 
paradoxically, these actors also observed strong countervailing forces to these mechanisms. In particular, 
they explained that the firms’ various offices (including the UK ones we investigated) tended to hoard or 
protect their own consultants, especially those seen as ‘stars’, and were reluctant to borrow or fully pay 
for those based in other offices overseas. Client project teams were then constituted through processes of 
negotiation where, contrary to managerial rhetoric, the interests of particular subsidiaries typically played 
a greater role than those of the ‘global’ firm and its clients. Thus, our firms’ subsidiaries acted in ways 
that undermined the very systems of which they claimed they were in support.  
How can we understand these findings? The interviewees themselves tended to provide an 
explanation that was both economic and organizational in character. In short, they felt that the structure of 
national profit centres and the incentive systems that this generated created a barrier to cross-national 
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cooperation. Thus, the countervailing forces discussed by our interviewees could be understood as a 
rational response to the organizational and incentive structures within which these actors were located. It 
follows that, in order to resolve the observed problems, senior management simply had to redesign the 
relevant structures to ensure that the right incentives were in place. However, such a change would have 
necessitated a substantial transfer of financial resources out of the richest offices into smaller and 
peripheral ones and, although the firms had discussed such a reform, none had made any substantial 
moves in that direction. 
Our argument is that this economic/organizational explanation is important but does not go far 
enough because it is underpinned by a ‘logic of consequences’, in which managers are assumed to be 
rational actors who organize firms by adopting organizational structures that best fit environmental 
contingencies. As we discussed earlier, in the field of organization studies, this logic has been largely 
superseded by a ‘logic of appropriateness’, in which organization is seen to occur under conditions of 
uncertainty, limited knowledge and conflicting goals. How, then, might the different institutionalist lenses 
we discussed earlier help us better understand our problem?  
Let us first consider the ‘institutional duality’ approach. Our empirical material did not reveal any 
significant headquarters-subsidiary tensions over modes of organizing work, as typically discussed in 
studies following this approach. Certainly, none of the UK consultants we interviewed demurred from the 
discourse of the ‘global’ firm; on the contrary, as noted above, they were supportive of such a discourse 
and considered it important to create ‘global’ firm structures. In this sense, our UK interviewees were 
casting their experiences in ‘a global frame rather than a national or local one’ (Meyer et al., 2006, p. 25). 
This finding might suggest that the firms we examined had become detached from national contexts, 
thereby confirming the view of the ‘global’ firm advocated by some management scholars (e.g. Ohmae, 
1990) and corporates executives (e.g. Palmisano, 2006) in the last twenty years. However, our research 
has shown that these firms were in reality far from having transcended national boundaries.  
Can the ‘comparative capitalisms’ approach shed more light on our problem? As with the 
‘institutional duality’ approach, this perspective would predict that headquarters-subsidiary tensions 
would arise over ways of organizing work. However, as we have discussed, our interviewees revealed no 
such tensions. The ‘comparative capitalisms’ approach does, however, offer an alternative way forward 
with its other focus on how different national contexts give rise to different patterns of sectoral 
specialization and thus different types of skills and organizations. In this respect, a few comparative 
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studies reveal how different national contexts produce different consulting markets in terms of, for 
instance, the nature of the services required, the sorts of organizations requiring consultants, and the way 
in which consultants are used (see e.g. Grimshaw & Miozzo, 2006; Kipping & Engwall, 2002; Kipping & 
Wright, 2012). These differences, in turn, yield varying levels of consultancy income and profitability 
(see e.g. Gross & Poor, 2008). Indeed, in revenue terms, the US and the UK alone account for more than 
half of the global consulting market (Gross & Poor, 2008; International Financial Services, 2005). Thus, 
international consultancies are potentially highly differentiated spaces, with national offices varying 
greatly in terms of number of employees and clients as well as the scale of revenue and profit generated. 
Further, behind these differences lies a hierarchy of power, prestige and wealth, with the US and UK 
offices being generally dominant thanks to their historic role in developing the consultancy profession 
(McKenna, 2006). It is relevant at this point to note that international consultancies appear much more 
geographically spread than most manufacturing multinationals. The latter tend to have operations in a 
limited number of key locations whereas the former perceive it necessary to keep an office in practically 
every country in order to serve their clients effectively (Gross & Poor, 2008). They therefore create a 
context for multiple interactions across national borders, but interactions that, as we have demonstrated, 
can be highly unequal because of the differences in scale and profitability of different consultancy 
markets.  
For the consultants whom we interviewed, the appropriate logic to follow in this differentiated and 
uneven context was to maximize UK office profits through the utilization of UK staff on UK owned 
projects and, where possible, the hiring of ‘cheaper’ consultants from overseas offices. When global 
teams were needed for their transnational projects, the UK consultants sought to minimize revenue 
outflows to protect UK profits. Inevitably, such a logic created conflicts over the allocation of revenues 
and resources within the firms and different forms of struggle and resistance emerged as a result. Offices 
based in other major economies such as the USA or in fast growing and institutionally distant emerging 
economies such as China held the key to large markets and major clients; they therefore had the potential 
to retaliate in damaging ways if their requests for more revenue were ignored in the UK. For this reason, 
there had to be some negotiation and bargaining. On the other hand, offices based in small and peripheral 
economies were seen to have few resources in their own right and therefore often unable to resist UK 
exploitation.  
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The firms considered the possibility of overcoming these tensions and inequalities through the 
introduction of more equitable incentive systems but, as some interviewees reported, the UK and other 
dominant offices resisted this solution since it would have reduced their profits and, by implication, their 
wealth, power and prestige. Moreover, many of the smaller offices around the world were seen as ‘less 
developed’ and far less important than the UK and other large offices in terms of their contributions to 
firm success. There was, for our interviewees, therefore no point in the large offices providing these 
offices with more revenue because they were largely irrelevant to sustaining the position of the firm in the 
global marketplace. Thus, even though the firms and, in particular, the consultants we interviewed 
adhered to ‘globalization’ (Drori et al., 2006; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005) and supported the implementation of 
‘global’ firm structures, they acted in ways that negated these very ideas. Their world was already pre-
structured as a ‘postcolonial hierarchy’ (Frenkel 2008, p. 934) that justified the cultural and economic 
dominance of large offices based in major Western nations and prevented them from perceiving any 
problems with the inequalities and differences on which this dominance depended and which were 
reproduced by it.  
In summary then, we suggest that understanding a case such as ours requires a combination of 
different strands of institutional theory. The least helpful in this respect appears to be the ‘institutional 
duality’ framework of analysis. Our interviewees did not point to significant organizational differences 
between themselves and central headquarters. As might be predicted from the ‘world society’ perspective, 
they viewed themselves as existing in a globalized world in which the management and organization of 
work no longer had a nationality. However, following Frenkel (2008), this view can be seen to be, at least 
in part, because these actors were embedded in the metropolitan heartlands where management 
consultancy and its global rhetoric were strong and the value of other countries, particularly in the 
developing world, was largely ignored. This, in turn, reflects the way in which international management 
consultancies have originally grown out of specific contexts, a point which emerges from a ‘comparative 
capitalisms’ analysis. The US and the UK developed a particular model of consultancy early in the 
twentieth century and remain among its strongest markets (Gross & Poor, 2008). This historical 
embeddedness is reflected in the taken-for-granted centrality of the US and the UK markets and the 
existence within the consultancies of a hierarchy of power and influence amongst the various offices. The 
contexts of the offices are very different, most particularly in terms of, firstly, their ability to produce 
markets for consultants and, secondly, their ability to deliver profitable opportunities to both firms and 
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consultants. The large offices in our four firms were unwilling to risk their own power and prestige in the 
system by dispersing their resources more widely across smaller and peripheral offices where they would 
generate less value. The firms, led as they were by the most powerful offices, were therefore unwilling to 
put in place systems that coerced these offices to redistribute their own assets, wealth and income to other 
subsidiaries. As a result, no matter what ‘global’ firm structures were implemented and no matter how 
strongly consultants saw themselves as part of a ‘global’ organization, the practical reality was one of 
international fragmentation and muddling through with the large offices exercising a broad hegemony 
over other parts of the firm.  
For these reasons, therefore, we support the ‘transnational’ approach, which takes into account both 
the national and transnational spheres (Morgan, 2001) as well as the uneven geography of the MNC as a 
socio-economic space (Boussebaa, 2008, 2009; Morgan, 2011). Actors such as our interviewees are 
situated in particular parts of this space and this positioning shapes their perspective on how the firm 
operates. These actors, however, perceive their organization in terms of a ‘global’ firm discourse 
supported by ‘global’ firm structures. In part, this is because they are located in the centre of the 
organization and because they serve multinational clients across nations. From this position, they promote 
the idea of the ‘global’ firm whilst simultaneously engaging in practices that reproduce and reinforce a 
hierarchy of nations within the organization.  
That said, the ‘postcolonial’ perspective is also helpful in understanding the organizational nature of 
MNCs such as the ones we have examined here in the sense that it encourages us to link the uneven 
geography of these organizations to long term processes of colonial and imperial domination. In 
particular, it helps us re-conceptualize ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ actors as ‘colonizing’ and ‘colonized’ 
actors and understand how the latter come to be dominated by the former. However, with the growing 
importance of the so-called ‘Rising Powers’ (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Russia and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries), the challenges from offices based in these nations to the existing systems of power 
and wealth are likely to grow in the future (Boussebaa, 2008). At the top of the firms’ hierarchy, US and 
UK dominance are also likely to be challenged by offices based in increasingly important European 
consultancy markets such as France and, in particular, Germany (Sturdy, 2011). Thus, the transnational 
social space of the firms is structured by power relations that have their roots in the broader international 
division of labour and history of colonialism and imperialism, and that are changing and evolving as the 
world economy takes on new, multi-polar forms in the 21
st
 century.  
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Conclusion 
Our research has explored the idea of the ‘global’ firm in the context of international management 
consultancies. Empirically, our contribution is to show that these organizations are establishing systems 
and practices that are increasingly global in scope but that these coordination mechanisms are being 
continually undermined by inter-office conflicts over the utilization of firm-wide human resources. 
Theoretically, we make two contributions. Our first is to suggest that approaches such as the ‘institutional 
duality’ approach and the ‘comparative capitalisms’ approach, which both emphasize significant 
institutionally derived differences between headquarters and subsidiaries, are no longer sufficient in 
understanding multinational organizations such as the ones examined here. The problem is that these 
organizations have made much progress towards the establishment of globally shared systems and 
practices. Their subsidiary employees support or profess to support these coordination mechanisms and, 
indeed, the idea of the ‘global’ firm more broadly. Inter-unit struggles over human resources prevent the 
firms from becoming truly ‘global’ but these tensions are not the product of conflicting logics of 
appropriateness between headquarters and subsidiary actors, as understood in the ‘institutional duality’ 
approach or the ‘comparative  capitalisms’ approach. Thus, at the level of systems and practices, we need 
to accept the growing influence of a global discourse such as that discussed by Meyer and his colleagues 
in their ‘world society’ thesis (e.g. Drori et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 1997). This is a significant institutional 
force in the contemporary era and must therefore be taken into account in our understanding of MNC 
organization.   
Our second theoretical contribution is to show that the ‘world society’ argument needs to be 
combined with some of the insights afforded by other institutionalist approaches if the organization of 
firms such as the ones we have studied is to be fully understood. A first step in this direction is to relate 
consultancy, as an industry, to specific national institutional contexts as suggested by the ‘comparative 
capitalisms’ approach and its focus on sectoral specialization. In so doing, it becomes clear that certain 
consultancy markets are much more lucrative than others and that, as a result, actors based in these 
lucrative contexts develop material interests that are antithetical to the idea of the ‘global’ firm. The bulk 
of profits within the firms are generated by a handful of large offices based in the largest consultancy 
markets. To act in ways that could potentially threaten such a reality (e.g. by sharing revenues with other 
offices) goes against the interests of these actors. Thus, despite much progress, completion of the ‘global’ 
firm project remains elusive, producing instead the paradox observed in this study, that is, a fundamental 
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clash between a shared aspiration to be truly ‘global’ and the reality of local, institutionally conditioned 
material interests of actors.  
Grasping these processes in turn requires seeing the firm as a transnational social space embedded in 
the wider, historic processes of colonialism and imperialism that have shaped, and continue to shape, 
corporate globalization. Indeed, we have shown how these processes can be built into seemingly neutral 
formal coordination mechanisms in much the same way as others have shown organizations, for example, 
to be gendered (Acker, 1992). In this sense, we agree with postcolonial scholars (e.g. Frenkel, 2008; 
Shimoni, 2011) that the study of MNC organization cannot be separated from the historical and 
contemporary development of the world geo-political economy. More specifically, we see these processes 
as having two important implications for MNC organization. Firstly, they contribute to the making of the 
MNC’s uneven geography and its implications in terms of actor centrality in, and commitment to, the 
‘global’ firm, as discussed above. Thus, for instance, central actors are still engaged in a form of imperial 
rivalry with each other (e.g. UK versus France) whilst simultaneously being united by a shared interest in 
sustaining their power over peripheral or colonized territories. They therefore share an interest in 
international expansion and domination, and in developing ‘global’ firm structures even if they engage in 
conflict and rivalry over control of ‘the empire’. Secondly, historic processes of colonialism and 
imperialism complicate the global-local problem by creating an additional set of tensions along 
colonizer/colonized lines above which is more than simply a home/host-country divide and/or a 
transnational/national division.  
We recognize that there is considerable scope to develop the empirical basis of our argument. First, 
the fact that our conclusions emerged from an analysis of the perceptions of UK consultants leaves us 
with the question of whether and how far these conclusions reflect the experiences of subsidiary actors 
based in different national contexts. Thus, research is needed from the perspective of consultants in 
nations other than the UK. One approach would be to extend our study to other advanced economies such 
as France, Germany and the USA. Another would be to focus on subsidiaries in more peripheral regions 
such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and examine how consultants (both locals and 
expatriates) perceive the issues discussed in this study. Both approaches would help further develop our 
understanding of the tension between the idea and the practice of the ‘global’ firm, and allow us to bring 
more directly into institutionalist discussions issues of transnationality and inequality in the world 
economy. Similar insights might be derived from looking at organizational and individual social identity 
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among different national groups, especially in terms of multiple and competing local and global identities 
and discourses. 
A second line of research would be to examine the extent to which our findings are relevant to other 
types of professional service firms such as accountancies, law firms, advertising agencies and 
recruitment/head-hunting firms. These operate in different professional service sectors and may therefore 
exhibit patterns of cooperation and conflict that are different from those observed in the present study. 
Law firms, for instance, have historically been characterized by strong national boundaries in terms of 
how professional work is defined and regulated, suggesting that the problem of ‘institutional duality’ may 
be more relevant for these organizations than we have observed in management consultancies. What 
seems clear, however, is that the multiple institutionalist lenses that we have outlined and applied to a 
particular context – international management consultancies – have the potential to shed much light on 
the interactions of multiple logics of appropriateness in MNCs. 
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Table 1: Largest global consultancies 
 
Firm International 
revenue $m 
 
1. IBM Global Services 
2. Accenture 
3. Deloitte 
4. NTT Data Systems 
5. Capgemini 
6. CSC 
7. Lockheed Martin 
8. Atos Origin 
9. McKinsey & Company 
10. Bearing Point 
11. Mercer 
12. Hewlett-Packard 
13. Booz Allen Hamilton 
14. SAP 
15. T-Systems 
16. LogicaCMG 
17. Oracle 
18. Unisys 
19. Siemens Business Services 
20. Steria  
13767 
8589 
6930 
6249 
3973 
3600 
3437 
3151 
3150 
3050 
2644 
2512 
2500 
2448 
2087 
1895 
1751 
1650 
1640 
1404 
N/A 
 
 
Source: International Financial Services (2005); originally sourced from Consultants News, May 2005 
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Table 2: Case-study firms and interviews by hierarchical level 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Career level 
 
Consult. 
1 
 
Consult. 
2 
 
Consult. 
3 
 
Consult. 
4 
 
Total 
 
Partner 
 
Partner  
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
5 
 
3 
 
16 
 
Manager 
Associate Partner 
Senior Manager 
Manager 
 
8 
 
7 
 
7 
 
8 
 
30 
 
Consultant 
Senior Consultant 
Consultant 
Analyst 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
15 
  
Total 
 
15 
 
14 
 
16 
 
16 
 
61 
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